

# The Constructible Universe

## Lecture II

15 April 2024

### Recap

Technique of inner models

Start with  $V \models \text{ZF}$  and form inner model  
 $M \subseteq V$  s.t.  $M \models \text{ZFC + CH}$ .

Substructures in model theory:

Propositional formulas absolute

$M \subseteq N$   
substructure

between  $M, N$

$\exists$ -formulas

upwards abs.

$\forall$ -formulas

downwards abs.

### Problem

In  $L$  there are no interesting propositional formulas.

So no reason to assume that  $M \subseteq V$  satisfies ANYthing.

Even "being  $\emptyset$ " is not pre-specified.

## §4 Transitive Substructures

From : Lecture I / Last page.

Def. If  $(M, E)$  is an  $\mathcal{L}$ -structure, we say that  $N \subseteq M$  is a **transitive substructure** if for all  $x \in N \wedge y \in M$ , if  $yEx$ , then  $y \in N$ .  
[That's just a model-theoretic reformulation of the standard notion of "transitive set".]

If  $N \subseteq M$  is transitive, then  $\Phi_0$  is absolute between  $N \wedge M$ .

Proof. Since  $\Phi_0$  was  $\mathcal{V}$ -formula, it is downwards absolute. Thus only need to show upwards.

Suppose not :  $(N, E) \models \Phi_0(x) \wedge (M, E) \models \neg \Phi_0(x)$

there is  $y \in M$  s.t.  
 $yEx$

$y \in N$

$\rightarrow (N, E) \models \neg \Phi_0(x)$

by transitivity Contradiction! q.e.d.

Extend absoluteness for transitive substructures:

Def. Define the class of  $\Delta_0$ -formulas by recursion as the smallest class containing all atomic formulas ( $x \in y$ ,  $x = y$ ), closed under propositional connectives, and closed under:

if  $\varphi$  is  $\Delta_0$ , then so is  
 $\exists x(x \in y \wedge \varphi)$

BOUNDED QUANTIFICATION

Abbreviated as  $\exists x \in y \varphi$

Theorem If  $M$  is transitive in  $N$ , then all  $\Delta_0$ -formulas are absolute between  $M, N$ .

Proof. By induction on rec. def. of  $\Delta_0$ .

① Atomic formulas abs. for all substructures.

② Proved last time when we did this for arbitrary substructures.

③ Clearly if  $\varphi$  is absolute, then  $\exists x(x \in y \wedge \varphi)$  is [as an  $\exists$ -formula] upwards absolute.

Suppose  $N \models \exists x(x \in a \wedge \varphi)$  for some  $a \in M$

Therefore there is  $b \in N$  s.t.  $N \models b \in a \wedge \varphi$

$b \in a \rightarrow b \in M \rightarrow M \models \exists x(x \in a \wedge \varphi) \text{ qed}$

We saw this in action in our example:

Empty set formula:

$$\begin{aligned}x = \emptyset &\iff \forall z (z \notin x) \\&\iff \neg \exists z \neg (z \notin x) \\&\iff \neg \exists z \underline{z \in x} \\&\iff \neg \exists z (z \in x \wedge z = z)\end{aligned}$$

So, this is a negation of a  
boundedly quantified formula,  
therefore a  $\Delta_0$ -formula.

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Let  $T$  be any theory, we say that  $\varphi$  is  
 $\Delta_T^T$  if there is a  $\Delta_0$ -formula  $\psi$  s.t.  
 $T \vdash \varphi \iff \psi$ .

Then we have that if  $M \subseteq N$ ,  $M$  is transitive  
in  $N$  and  $M, N \models T$ , then  $\Delta_T^T$ -formulas  
are absolute between  $M, N$ .

This gives us the following alternative bounded  
quantification:

abbreviated as  
 $\forall x \forall y \varphi$

$$\begin{aligned}\forall x (\forall y \rightarrow \varphi) &\iff \neg \exists x \neg (\forall y \rightarrow \varphi) \\&\iff \neg \exists x \neg (\forall y \vee \varphi) \iff \neg \exists (\forall y \wedge \neg \varphi)\end{aligned}$$

get  $\exists x \in y \varphi \iff \neg \forall x \in y \neg \varphi$ .

A list of  $\Delta_0^T$ -formulas for  $T = \text{Predicate Logic.}$

$$1. x \in y$$

$$2. x = y$$

$$3. x \subseteq y \iff \forall z \in x (z \in y)$$

$$4. z = \{x, y\} \iff x \in z \wedge y \in z \wedge \forall w \in z (w = x \vee w = y)$$

$$5. z = \{x\}$$

$$6. z = (x, y) = \{\{x\}, \{x, y\}\}$$

$$7. z = \emptyset$$

$$8. z = x \cup y \iff x \subseteq z \wedge y \subseteq z$$

$$\forall w \in z (w \in x \vee w \in y)$$

$$9. z = x \cap y$$

$$10. z = x \setminus y$$

$$11. z = x \cup \{x\}$$

$$12. \varphi(x) =$$

$x$  is transitive

$$13. z = \bigcup x$$

Important to note

This only means that the formulas describing these are absolute, not the corresponding existence axioms.

$$\forall x \forall y \exists p (p = \{x, y\})$$

E.g.)  $\{\emptyset\}$  is transitive, but  
 $\forall x \exists s (s = \{x\})$   
 is false in  $\{\emptyset\}$ , but can be true  
 in  $N$ .

Let's start our analysis of transitive substructures with the "structural" axioms:

Extensionality  
Foundation

① Extensionality

$$\forall x \forall y (x = y \leftrightarrow \forall w (w \in x \leftrightarrow w \in y))$$

$$\forall x \forall y (x = y \leftrightarrow (x \subseteq y \wedge y \subseteq x))$$

Suppose  $(N, E) \models \text{Ext}$ . Can we show  $(M, E) \models \text{Ext}$  if  $M \subseteq N$  is transitive?

Clearly, since  $\Delta_0$  is absolute and the axiom is of the form  $\forall \psi$  with  $\psi \Delta_0$ , we get downwards absoluteness.

② Foundation

$$\forall x \exists m (m \in x \wedge \forall w (w \in m \rightarrow (w \in x \wedge w \neq x)))$$

Suppose  $(N, E) \models \text{Foundation}$  and  $(M, E) \models \neg \text{Foundation}$  with  $M$  transitive.

So, there  $a \in M$  without minimal element in  $M$ .

Clearly as  $N \supseteq M$  and by Foundation in  $N$ , we have a  $b \in N$  that is minimal in  $N$ :

$$\frac{N \models \forall z \neg (z \in b \wedge z \in a)}{\xrightarrow{\text{st. } b \in a} \xrightarrow{\text{trs}} b \in M} \quad \begin{matrix} \text{once more } \forall \text{ applied to} \\ \Delta_0, \text{ so downwards} \\ \text{absolute} \end{matrix}$$

$$\implies M \models \forall z \neg (z \in b \wedge z \in a)$$

Thus  $b$  is  $E$ -minimal in  $M$ , and so we obtain a contradiction!

Summary If we have  $(N, E)$  a model of Ext + Foundation, then  $(M, E)$  where  $M$  is  $\Delta_0$  in  $N$  will also satisfy Ext + Foundation.

$$\boxed{\begin{aligned} & \forall z (z \notin b \vee z \notin a) \\ & \forall z (z \in b \rightarrow z \notin a) \\ & \forall z \in b (z \notin a) \\ & \neg \exists z \in b (z \in a) \end{aligned}}$$

Remark The same argument gives us preservation of wellfoundedness between the submodels and the big model.

Observation If  $M \subseteq N$  is transitive and  $N$  is a model of pairing and for each  $x, y \in M$ ,  $\{x, y\} \in M$ .  
then  $M \models$  Pairing Axiom.  
Similarly for the Union Axiom.

This is an equivalence:  
if for some  $x, y \in M$ ,  $\{x, y\} \notin M$ ,  
then  $M \not\models$  Pairing  
& similarly for Union, since  
 $z = \{x, y\}$  is  $\Delta_0$ .

This is slightly different for power set:  
if for  $x \in N$ ,  $P(x) \in M$ ,  
then  $M \models$  Power set,  
but this is not necessary as our example of  
 $(N, \in) \models$  Power set  
from Lecture I shows.

An operation on a model  $N$  is called definable  
if  $F$

if there is a formula  $\Phi$  s.t.

$$z = F(x_1, \dots, x_n) \iff N \models \Phi(z, x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

We say that  $\checkmark$  the operation  $F$  is absolute  
between  $M$  &  $N$  if the formula  $\Phi$  is  
absolute.

That means that  $F(x, y) := \{x, y\}$  is  
an operation under the assumption of  
the pairing axiom & then absolute  
by the previous observation.

Lemmas If  $\varphi$  is absolute and  $F, G_1, \dots, G_n$   
are absolute operations, then

$$\psi(x_1, \dots, x_n) := \varphi(G_1(x_1, \dots, x_n), \dots, G_n(x_1, \dots, x_n))$$

$$H(x_1, \dots, x_n) := F(G_1(x_1, \dots, x_n), \dots, G_n(x_1, \dots, x_n))$$

are absolute.

Proof. Just check the definiteness.

Remark. Concatenation of  $\Delta_0$  formulas and operations still gives absolute formula & operations but not necessarily  $\Delta_0$ .

Kunen's book

$$F(u) = u + u \quad \text{for } n \in N$$

$$F(x) = 0 \quad \text{for } x \notin N$$

can be written as concatenation of  $\Delta_0$  but not as  $\Delta_0$ .

further absolute notions:

1.  $z$  is an ordered pair

2.  $z = a \times b$

3.  $z$  is a relation

4.  $\text{dom}(z)$

5.  $\text{ran}(z)$

6.  $z$  is a function

7.  $z$  is an injection

8.  $z$  is a surjection

9.  $z$  is a bijection

$$\cup \{\{x\}, \{x, y\}\}$$

$$= \{xy\} = \{x\} \cup \{x, y\}$$

## § 5 Relativisation

Def.  $M \subseteq N$  is a definable substructure  
 if there is a formula  $\Phi$  s.t.  
 $x \in M \iff N \models \Phi(x)$ .

For definable substructures, we can talk about  
 truth in  $M$  from the point of view of  $N$ :

Define  $\varphi^{\Phi}$  by recursion:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (x = y)^{\Phi} &:= x = y \\
 (x \in y)^{\Phi} &:= \varphi_{\in}^{\Phi} y \\
 (\varphi \wedge \psi)^{\Phi} &:= \varphi^{\Phi} \wedge \psi^{\Phi} \\
 (\neg \varphi)^{\Phi} &:= \neg \varphi^{\Phi} \\
 (\exists x \varphi)^{\Phi} &:= \underline{\exists x (\Phi(x) \wedge \varphi^{\Phi})}
 \end{aligned}$$

Relativisation of  
the quantifier

By simple induction, get

$$(M, E) \models \varphi \iff (N, E) \models \varphi^{\Phi}.$$

This makes the annoying talk of  
 logicians (e.g., "N knows that  $\varphi$  is  
 true in  $M$ ") much less mysterious.

So, e.g., if  $M$  is transitive, then

$$N \models \text{Ext}^M$$

[If  $M$  is definable by formula  $\Phi$ , we also write  $\varphi^M$  for  $\varphi^\Phi$ .]

Corollary

Suppose  $T, S$  are two theories s.t.

there is a formula  $\Phi$  s.t.

$$T \vdash \varphi^\Phi \text{ for any } \varphi \in S.$$

$$\text{Then } \text{Cons}(T) \implies \text{Cons}(S).$$

Proof.

Suppose  $\neg \text{Cons}(S)$ , so

$$S \vdash \varphi \wedge \neg \varphi.$$

Assuming  $\text{Cons}(T)$ , we have

$$N \models T$$

$$\begin{aligned} N &\models (\varphi \wedge \neg \varphi)^\Phi \\ \implies N &\models \varphi^\Phi \text{ and } N \models (\neg \varphi)^\Phi \\ &\quad [\Leftrightarrow N \models \neg \varphi^\Phi] \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Together } N \models \varphi^\Phi \wedge \neg \varphi^\Phi$$

So,  $T$  is inconsistent.

q.e.d.

## §6

### von Neumann hierarchy

### CUMULATIVE HIERARCHY

$$V_0 := \emptyset$$

$$V_{\alpha+1} := P(V_\alpha)$$

$$V_\lambda := \bigcup_{\alpha < \lambda} V_\alpha \quad \lambda \text{ limit ordinal}$$

We know:

- ① All  $V_\alpha$  are transitive.
- ②  $\rho(x) := \min\{\alpha ; j \in V_\alpha\}$
- $\rho(x) = \sup\{\rho(y)+1 ; y \in x\}$

Remark This is usually used to prove  
 $\text{Göd}(ZF^-) \rightarrow \text{Göd}(ZF)$

$\uparrow$   
 $ZF$  without  
Foundation

This is precisely an  
inner model argument  
as sketched on the  
last page.

Q If  $\alpha$  is any ordinal which axioms of  
set theory hold in  
 $(V_\alpha, \in)$ ?

This is again an "inner model argument"  
which we will see in Lecture III.

from

## Lecture II

### §6 von Neumann hierarchy

COLLATINE HIERARCHY

$$V_0 := \emptyset$$

$$V_{\alpha+1} := P(V_\alpha)$$

$$V_\lambda := \bigcup_{\alpha < \lambda} V_\alpha \quad \lambda \text{ limit ordinal}$$

We know:

- ① All  $V_\alpha$  are transitive.
- ②  $\rho(x) := \min\{\alpha \mid j \in V_\alpha\}$
- $\rho(x) = \sup\{\rho(y) \mid y \in x\}$

Remark

This is usually used to prove

$\text{GCH}(\text{ZF}^-)$

$\text{GCH}(\text{ZF})$

$\uparrow$   
 $\text{ZF without Foundation}$

This is precisely an  
inner model argument  
as sketched on the  
last page.

Q If  $\alpha$  is any ordinal which axioms of  
set theory hold in  
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This is again an "inner model argument"  
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