

CDI

COMPUTABILITY
DECIDABILITY
INCOMPLETENESS

VIII

Eight Lecture

6 June 2023

DECISION PROBLEMS

A PROBLEM is just a subset A of \mathbb{W}^n , interpreted as "Given $\vec{w} \in \mathbb{W}^n$, can you decide whether $\vec{w} \in A$?"

From Lecture I:

"man soll eine Verfahren angeben"

Verfahren \rightarrow Algorithmus

HILBERT'S PROBLEMS

A positive answer to #10 does not require to define "procedure".

A negative answer needs a definition of "VERFAHREN".
INTERPRETED as "algorithm".



David HILBERT
1862-1943

HAD

D. Hilbert, Mathematische Probleme, Kgl. Ges. Wiss. Göttingen 1900

10. Entscheidung der Lösbarkeit einer Diophantischen Gleichung

Eine Diophantische Gleichung mit irgend welchen Unbekannten und mit ganzen rationalen Zahlausdrücken sei vorgelegt: man soll ein Verfahren angeben, nach welchem sich mittels einer endlichen Anzahl von Operationen entscheiden läßt, ob die Gleichung in ganzen rationalen Zahlen lösbar ist.

Friuli Lecture I:

Das ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROBLEM



Hilbert-Ackermann
1928

§ 12. Das Entscheidungsproblem.

Aus den Überlegungen des vorigen Paragraphen ergibt sich die grundsätzliche Wichtigkeit des Problems, bei einer gegebenen Formel des Prädikatenkalküls zu erkennen, ob es sich um eine identische Formel handelt oder nicht. Nach der in § 1 gegebenen Definition bedeutet die Identität einer Formel dasselbe wie die Allgemeingültigkeit der Formel für jeden Individuenbereich. Man pflegt deswegen auch von dem Problem der Allgemeingültigkeit einer Formel zu sprechen. Genauer müßte man statt Allgemeingültigkeit Allgemeingültigkeit für jeden Individuenbereich sagen. Die identischen Formeln des Prädikatenkalküls sind nach den Ausführungen des § 10 gerade die Formeln, die aus dem Axiomensystem des § 1 sich ableiten lassen. Zu einer Lösung des Problems der Allgemeingültigkeit vermag uns diese Tatsache nicht zu helfen, da wir kein allgemeines Kriterium für die Allgemeingültigkeit einer Formel haben.

Q: Given a formula φ in predicate logic, is there an algorithm that determines whether φ is valid?

CONTRAST For propositional logic, the method of truth-tables produces an algorithm that checks validity.

Rewinder

Distinction between EXISTENCE PROOFS and CONSTRUCTIVE PROOFS:

Substitution Lemma

If f and g are computable, then $f \circ g$ is computable.

Used in the proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorem
Software principle
Solvability principle
like this:

VERSUS

There is an algorithm that transforms machines M, N s.t. $f = f_{M,1} \wedge g = f_{N,1}$ to a machine \bar{M} s.t. $f \circ g = f_{\bar{M},1}$.

Analyzing thus :

We observe that we interpreted "there is an algorithm that transforms \vec{w} into \vec{v} "

as

$\vec{w} \rightarrow \vec{v}$ can be performed
by a RM

So, in our application, we identified
"algorithm" with RM.

Q : Is that a reasonable interpretation
in general?



Alan TURING
1912-1954



Alonzo CHURCH
1903-1995

Turing aimed to formalise the notion of COMPUTATION and transform it into a mathematical model of computation;

Church constructed a class of functions mathematically corresponding to usual computable processes.

It turns out : Any function f is computable iff it is recursive.

[We only proved \Leftarrow .]

ROBUSTNESS

This is a non-mathematical, informal notion that a concept is invariant under small changes to the definition.

Pennant

As it turns out, it is the notion of computability rather than the notion of computation that is robust.

ILLUSTRATION

Turing machines

Turing's 1936 paper defined computation in terms of Turing machines rather than RM.

A Turing machine has an infinite tape, indexed with \mathbb{N} , a read/write head that moves on the tape, each "cell" of the tape may contain $s \in \Sigma$, the head reads it and acts according to what it sees.

Q : set of states

Σ^N : "configuration" on the tape

$$s : Q^{\Sigma \times M} \longrightarrow Q \times \Sigma \times M$$

transition factors

Snapshot: $Q \times \sum^N \times N$

As before, given a TM [Turing machine] and a configuration ["input"], we can define by recursion an (infinite) computation sequence of snapshots.

In precisely the same way as for RM, we can now define where a computable is halting and define a partial fu

$$f_M : W \dashrightarrow W$$

defined by the halting computations of M.

Def. A function $f : W \dashrightarrow W$ is partial TM computable if there is a TM M s.t. $f = f_M$.

Theorem (no proof) For every $f : W \dashrightarrow W$, f is computable iff f is TM computable.


Variants of TM

①

Number of tapes

Have three tapes :

INPUT TAPE	(read only)
SCRATCH TAPE	(read/write)
OUTPUT TAPE	(write only)



①a Or maybe output tape also read/write.

①b Or may have independent heads that move on the three tapes.

②

Behaviour at cell 0.

If the head is on cell 0 and receives the motion instruction LEFT, what happens?

Options :

- a Machine explodes
→ halting?
→ undefined?

- b LEFT is interpreted as STAY.

NOTE

The notion of COMPUTATION heavily depends on the choice of variant of TM.

Therefore: The notion of COMPUTATION (even the notion of TM COMPUTATION) is not robust in the above sense.

Theorem (no proof).

If I have two diff. variants of TM from the list on page 7, then their respective notions of TM computability are equivalent.

So: if M is a TM of variant 1 s.t.

$$f_M = f,$$

then there is some N TM of variant 2 s.t. $f_N = f$.

Thus: TM computability is robust.

This robustness goes much further: as observed,

TM computability



RM computability



recursiveness

and there are many other model of computation that yield eq. notions of COMPUTABILITY.

Our more example:

WHILE computable functions

We design a very basic programming language
that has the power of variable assignments
and WHILE loops:

WHILE Φ DO ... j

instruction

This can be used to define recursively
a notion of WHILE COMPUTATION,
as well as HALTING, and thus a
notion of WHILE COMPUTABLE partial fu.

Theorem (no proof) $f: \mathbb{W} \dashrightarrow \mathbb{W}$
is WHILE computable \iff
it is computable

IMPORTANT

This does not mean that
RM computation,
TM computation, and
WHILE computation
are the same; only the derived notion
of computability.

Remark This is also relevant for the discussion about Quantum Computation. Quantum Computation is vastly different from classical computation, reemploying entanglement for parallel computing. But the corresponding notion of Quantum Computability is once more eq. to Turing's notion.

1937 Turing & Church observed (empirically) that computability is robust and formulated this in what is now known as the

Church-Turing Thesis (= Church's Thesis)

Any reasonable attempt to formalise the intuitive notion of computation will lead to a notion of computability that is equivalent to TM/RM computability.

This is not a mathematical statement. It relies on "intuitive notion of computation" and "reasonable attempt"; so it could be subject to counterexample and it is fundamentally unprovable.

It's more of an empirical modelling statement
as is common in the natural science:

Geometry of physical space
is well represented
by \mathbb{R}^3 .

Therefore If we take the CT thesis on board, then also right interpretation of words such as

ALGORITHM
COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE
is "performed by a RM".

Definition $A \subseteq W$ is DECIDABLE
if and only if A is a computable set.
[i.e., the question " $\vec{w} \in A?$ " can be answered by a RM].

DECISION PROBLEM

1. Entscheidungsproblem.
Formula φ and the problem is $\{ \varphi; \vdash \varphi \}$
2. Hilbert 10.
Given $p \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$, is there $z \in \mathbb{Z}$ s.t. $p(z) = 0$.
The problem is $\{ p \in \mathbb{Z}[X]; \exists z \quad p(z) = 0 \}$
3. Word problem:
Given a language $L \subseteq W$ and $w \in W$, is $w \in L$?
Normally, we are given a class of languages \mathcal{C} parametrised by word
 $\mathcal{C} = \{ L_w; w \in W \}$.
Then the problem is $\{ (w, v); w \in L_v \}$
4. Emptiness problem: As before, $\mathcal{C} = \{ L_w; w \in W \}$ and $\{ w; L_w = \emptyset \}$
5. Equivalence problem As before, $\mathcal{C} = \{ L_w; w \in W \}$ and $\{ (w, v); L_w = L_v \}$.

How are 1. & 2. Decision Problems?

For 1., we need a representation of the formulas $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ by words $w \in W$.
If we have this, we can w.l.o.g.
assume $\mathcal{L} \subseteq W$.

Then $\{ \varphi_j \vdash \varphi \} \subseteq W$,

so it's a decision problem.

More about the ENTSCHEIDUNGS-
PROBLEM in lecture IX.

For 2., we need representations of \mathbb{Z}
and $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ in W . Say w_p is the
word representing $p \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$.

[Note that we encoded \mathbb{N} in W by
binary seq. Clearly elements of \mathbb{Z} are
just elements of \mathbb{N} with a sign \pm ;
and elements of $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ are just
finite seq. of elements of \mathbb{Z} .]

Then $\{ w_p ; \exists z \in \mathbb{Z} \ \varphi(z) = 0 \}$

is the decision problem for H1O.

Now talk about 3., 4., and 5.

They all have

$$\mathcal{E} = \{L_w; w \in W\};$$

we need to decide which class \mathcal{E} we use.
[This is really important for the answer, as
we'll see in a moment.]

What about $\mathcal{E} = \{A; A \text{ is c.e.}\}$
 $= \{W_w; w \in W\}?$

For this choice of \mathcal{E} , we get

$$\begin{aligned} 3. \quad \{(w, v); w \in W_v\} &= \{(w, v); w \in \text{dom}(f_{v, 1})\} \\ &= \{(w, v); f_{v, 1}(w) \downarrow\} \\ &= \mathbb{K}_0. \end{aligned}$$

So this is not computable, so not decidable

In words: The word problem for c.e. sets
is not decidable.

$$4. \quad \{w; W_w = \emptyset\} = \text{Emp}$$

This is not computable by Rice's Theorem.

In words: The emptiness problem for
c.e. sets is not decidable.

5. Equivalence problem

$$\{ (w, v) ; W_w = W_v \} = Eq$$

We show that

$$Emp \leq_m Eq.$$

Let e be s.t. $W_e = \emptyset$.

The function $h : w \mapsto (w, e)$ can be performed
by a register machine.

So if Eq is computable, i.e., χ_{Eq} is a computable
function, then so is

$$\chi_{Eq} \circ h = \chi_{Emp},$$

so Emp is computable. Contradiction?

Therefore : The equivalence problem for c.e.
sets is not decidable.