
Abstracts
Anekantavada between Logic, Epistemology and Religion

Unlike other elements of Indian logic, the Jaina teaching of the manysidedness of reality is still
very much part of an active religious community. Anekantavada and syadvada are sometimes
used almost
as synonyms for Jaina philosophy and religion. They are associated not only with logic, ontology and
epistemology but also with environmental ethics, interreligious tolerance and even 'modern' science.
My research tries to show that while many of these associations seem rather farfetched, the plurality
of spheres into which anekantavada extends is of relevance also for attempts to formalize Jaina logic.
The problem of the apparently redundant elements of the saptabhangi can, for example, be understood in
the context of the religious concept of the omniscient, i.e., when taken not only as a logical model
but also as a kind of spiritual 'visualisation aid' on the path to perfect knowledge.

Melanie Barbato
München, Germany


Jonardon Ganeri, Argumentation, Dialogue and the
Kathavatthu: PDF file

Jonardon Ganeri
Brighton, United Kingdom

Tailoring symbolic clothes for ancient logic
 In order to assess the applicability of
modern formal systems to ancient Indian logic, it is worth looking into
the development of European logic, where, earlier than in indology, tools
of modern formal logic have been used for the research into ancient
logical systems. Frege's quantifier logic, invented during the last
quarter of the 19th century, not only led to a revolution regarding the
utilization of formal logic in the area of the foundations of mathematics,
but also with regard to the use of formal logical methods as a tool for
the interpretation of ancient logical texts. Whereas the triumphal march
of quantifier logic in the field of mathematics for which it had been
designed was doubtlessly justified, the situation in the area of history
and philosophy of logic encountered obstacles. Not until Frege's
interpretation of Aristotelian syllogistics, which was subsequently copied
into almost every elementary logic textbook, had been overthrown by the
eminent modern formal logician Jan Łukasiewicz, did the new
illfitting Fregean clothes of ancient logic fall off, and the field for a
new debate on the formal aspects of Aristotle's logic become open again.
This led in 1972 to John Corcoran's now widely accepted formal
interpretation of Aristotelian syllogistics. Starting with
Łukasiewicz's student Stanisław Schayer around 1930, research in
the field of ancient Indian logic also switched tools from Aristotelian
syllogistic to modern symbolical logic. As in the case of ancient European
logic, there is a risk that philosophically insensitive misapplication of
this method distorts ancient texts and injects artificially generated
problems, thus creating obscurity and confusion instead of clarity and
precision.

Klaus Glashoff
Lugano, Switzerland

Jain contextsensitive approach to knowledge
in the light of argumentative practices

From the seventh to the eleventh centuries approximately, Jain
philosophers have developed a contextsensitive approach to knowledge
(nayavâda) according to which given contextual elements are
decisive in
the determination of the meaning and validity of a thesis.
In western modern terms, it would be quite natural to understand this
theory from a modal perspective, see Ganeri [2002]. Promising studies on
new ways to conceive contextual validity have been developed by Priest
[2008] and Humberstone [2008] in this line. The problem is that the
conceptions of Jain philosophers do not seem to match the standard
conceptions of modal logic, because the contextualisation process is not
about propositions but about objects that are subjects of a predication
and is performed outside the object language.
Using a pragmatic semantics that provides a general theory for meaning
based on argumentative practices, I propose in this talk a new reading on
Jain theory of viewpoints such as presented in Prabhcandra's
Prameyakamalamârtanda, The Sun of the Lotus of the Knowables,
a
10th
century work in the line of Akalanka?s philosophical tradition. The main
idea of this reading is to make explicit the ontological assumptions
handled by an agent when she asserts a given thesis. This talk is based
on a joint paper with Clerbout and Rahman.

MarieHélène Gorisse
Lille, France

Ibn Sina's Cyclotron

In around 1025, early in his major commentary on Aristotle's
Prior Analytics, Ibn Sina describes a geometric construction. It bears
an uncanny resemblance to the design for a cyclotron collider which
Rolf Wideroe tried and failed to patent in 1943. Ibn Sina believed that
this and related examples did serious damage to Aristotle's view of
logic. But exactly what conclusions did Ibn Sina expect his readers
to draw from the examples? A modern answer might well mention
multiple quantification, dynamic predicate logic and the failure of
ominimality in the reals with sine function. But clearly Ibn Sina
didn't expect his readers to know these modern theories. The
question requires us to understand what Ibn Sina thought logic
consists of. Two other questions that we need to answer along
the way are: (1) Why did Ibn Sina continue to teach and use a
logic that he regarded as misconceived? (2) What follows for
standard accounts of the difference between aristotelian and
modern logic?
Wilfrid Hodges, Ibn Sina on analysis: 1. Proof Search. Or:
Abstract
State Machines as a tool for the history of logic. PDF file

Wilfrid Hodges
London, England

Lessons from Nâgârjuna

For the modern reader interested in argumentation theory, or more
generally in logic conceived as a theory of justification through
linguistic interaction,
Nâgârjuna
presents some strikingly interesting features. In this talk, we
present some of these:
 the relations between the notion of thesis (or claim), the notion of
burden of the proof and the notion of proposition;
 presupposition handling and negation(s);
 "universally" and "conventionally" adverbs as modalities.
We show how to capture these features in a modern conceptual framework
(namely Dialogical logic) and comment on the light it sheds on some of
Nâgârjuna's famous
and controversial philosophical tenets.

Laurent Keiff
Lille, France

Are there cognitive predicates in
Dharmakīrtian inferences from
nonperception?

This paper deals with a particular pattern of reasoning formulated and
analyzed
by the South Asian Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (ca. 600660 CE):
from
the
ascertained fact that a particular object like a jar (which would
necessarily
be perceived if it existed) is not perceived, one infers that this object
does
not exist. Such inferences, in which the noncognition and nonperception
(anupalabdhi) of an object serves as evidence, seem to differ
crucially
from
other inferences envisioned by Buddhist logicians, such as the one from
smoke
rising above a hill to the presence of firethey involve cognitive
predicates. In this paper I am going to present how Dharmakīrti and
other
logicians dealt with this (perhaps only apparent) peculiarity.

Birgit Kellner
Heidelberg, Germany

Some methodological aspects of
formalization with respect to Indian philosophical
teachings

Aim of the lecture is to explicate a concept of formal description and to
explore its relevance for investigations on nonWestern traditions of
thought and in particular with respect to teachings assigned to the
tradition of Indian philosophy. It will be claimed that in the context of
studies of Indian theoretical systems formal descriptions can possess (at
least) three significant functions which could be characterized by the
terms: 1) representative, 2) analytic and 3) critical function. Apart from
presenting a more elaborate explication of the pertinent functions
methodological issues pertaining to the derivation of formal descriptions
from formulations occurring in textual sources constitute a major topic of
the paper.

Claus Oetke
Stockholm, Sweden

The Catuskoti

In early Buddhist logic, it was standard to assume that for any state
of
affairs there were four possibilities: that it held, that it did not,
both,
or neither. This is the catuskoti (or tetralemma). Classical logicians
have
had a hard time making sense of this, but it makes perfectly good sense in
the semantics of various paraconsistent logics, such as First Degree
Entailment. Matters are more complicated for later Buddhist thinkers, such
as Nagarjuna, who appear to suggest that none or these options, or more
than
one, may hold. The point of this talk to to examine the matter, including
the formal logical machinery that may be appropriate.

Graham Priest
Melbourne, Australia

The Interactive and Epistemological
Turn in Logic

The recent trend in logic has been to shift emphasis from static
systems developed for purely theoretical reasons to dynamic systems
designed for application to real world situations, such as modelling
knowledge and belief, interaction, and reasoning in multiagent
systems. This emphasis on the situational and applied aspects of logic
and reasoning is relatively new in contemporary logic, but it was the
dominant approach to logic by logicians in the high Middle Ages,
especially in mid13th to mid14th C. Medieval logic was concerned
with techniques of reasoning that could be applied in real reasoning
contexts, and thus which could vary from context to context. This
pragmatic approach to logic was complimented with a strong interest in
modelling dynamic, interactive systems, where reasoning is not an
armchair process of a single agent but is instead a dispute or debate
between two or more agents, each of which have different knowledge and
different roles in the disputation. In this respect, medieval Western
logic and medieval Indian logic, particularly in the NavyaNyāya
tradition have much more in common than either of these have with the
mathematical logic of the early 20th century. Recently scholars of
logic have approached both traditions in a similar fashion, using the
new tools and techniques developed in recent decades. We survey and
discuss these tools and techniques with a view towards their possible
applications in formalizing premodern logical theories.
PDF file of the slides
Sara L. Uckelman,
Aristotelian Syllogistics with Abelardian Truth Conditions. Notes
on the formalization of existential import, triggered by a discussion
after Klaus Glashoff's talk: PDF
file.

Sara L. Uckelman
Amsterdam, The Netherlands


