

Regularity Properties and Definability

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2. Definability: *what does logic have to do with it?*
3. Gödel, Solovay, Shelah: *...getting technical...*

1. Regularity Properties

The setting

- The **real number continuum**: \mathbb{R} , \mathbb{R}^n (alternatively: $\mathcal{P}(\omega)$, ω^ω , 2^ω , \dots).

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
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
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
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


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


$$A = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid x^2 + y^2 \leq r^2\}$$

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


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


$$A = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid 0 \leq x \leq a, 0 \leq y \leq b\}$$

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


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Notice that from a set-theoretic point of view, all of the above “objects” are *subsets of the continuum* (in this case, $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$).

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Regularity properties: isolated specifically to avoid such counter-intuitive constructions.

Lebesgue measure

Motivating example: [Lebesgue measure](#).

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
Is it possible to define a function $\mu : \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R}^n) \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ measuring the “size” or “volume” of a set $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$?

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


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

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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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$$\mu(A) = \int_a^b f(x) dx$$

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Henri Lebesgue, in his PhD thesis from 1902, defined a precise way of measuring the “size” or “volume” of subsets $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ (needed for the definition of the *Lebesgue integral*).

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Easy modern proof.

Let U be an ultrafilter on ω . Identify $\mathcal{P}(\omega)$ with 2^ω , then U is non-Lebesgue-measurable as a subset of 2^ω (easy to translate to \mathbb{R} or \mathbb{R}^n).

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
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
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


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Impossible? Mathematically possible, but the pieces are *not Lebesgue-measurable* (so our spatial intuition does not apply).

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And what does that even mean?

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2. Definability

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Complexity of \mathbb{N}^2 -formulas: $\Sigma_n^0, \Pi_n^0, \dots, \Sigma_n^1, \Pi_n^1, \dots$ (number of alternating quantifiers).

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
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
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A set A is *projective* if it is Σ_n^1 or Π_n^1 for some n .


Projective hierarchy



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Connection with topology:

- $\Sigma_1^0 =$ open,
- $\Pi_1^0 =$ closed,
- $\Delta_1^1 =$ Borel,
- $\Sigma_1^1 =$ analytic (continuous image of Borel),
- $\Pi_1^1 =$ co-analytic (complement of analytic).

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
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
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The same holds for **all other** (reasonable) regularity properties!
(proofs scattered throughout 20th century).


Back to the hierarchy ...



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OK!

No “weird things” or “paradoxes” can occur if we restrict attention to analytic sets.

Philosophical Intermezzo

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
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
- 1 The world is inherently 'logical' in nature. Logically simpler objects are somehow 'nicer' in reality.
- 2 The concepts which humans devised to describe/model the world, are (subconsciously) based on some kind of language, and therefore are of limited logical complexity and/or are somehow related to logic.

What next?




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


What next?



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Many mathematicians worked on this problem in the early 20th century but were unable to solve it.

What next?

“Les efforts que j’ai faits pour résoudre cette question m’ont conduit à ce résultat tout inattendu: il existe une famille . . . d’ensembles effectifs telle qu’on ne sait pas et l’on ne saura jamais si un ensemble quelconque de cette famille (supposé non dénombrable) a la puissance du continu, s’il est ou non de troisième catégorie, ni même s’il est mesurable . . . c’est la famille des ensembles projectifs de M. H. Lebesgue. Il ne reste donc qu’à reconnaître la nature de ce fait nouveau.” [Luzin, 1925]

“The efforts that I exerted on the resolution of this question led me to the following totally unexpected discovery: there exists a family . . . consisting of effective [definable] sets, such that one does not know *and one will never know* whether every set from this family, if uncountable, has the cardinality of the continuum, nor whether it is of the third category, nor whether it is measurable. . . . This is the family of the *projective sets* of Mr. H. Lebesgue. It remains but to recognize the nature of this new development.”

3. Gödel, Solovay, Shelah

Constructible universe

Gödel's constructible universe:

- $L_0 := \emptyset$
- $L_{\alpha+1} := \text{Def}(L_\alpha)$
- $L_\lambda := \bigcup_{\alpha < \lambda} L_\alpha$ (for limit ordinals λ).

$$\mathbb{L} := \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mathbf{Ord}} L_\alpha$$

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$$\mathbb{L} := \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mathbf{Ord}} L_\alpha$$

\mathbb{L} is a so-called *inner model* of set theory: it satisfies all axioms of ZFC, plus additional axioms (e.g., GCH). The “real universe” \mathbb{V} could be \mathbb{L} , or it could be larger than \mathbb{L} . The statement “ $\mathbb{V} = \mathbb{L}$ ” is the *axiom of constructibility*.

Well-ordering the reals in \mathbb{L}

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Theorem (Gödel, 1938)

One cannot prove in ZFC that all Σ_2^1 sets are Lebesgue measurable or have the Property of Baire. One cannot prove in ZFC that all Π_1^1 sets satisfy the Perfect Set Property.

Forcing

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- In a specific way, from \mathbb{P} one derives a so-called *generic object* G , which lies outside the model M .
- $M[G]$: least model of ZFC extending M and containing G .
- Using technical properties of \mathbb{P} , we have some control over the additional axioms that hold in $M[G]$.

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Theorem (Solovay, 1970)

There is a forcing extension $\mathbb{L}[G]$ of \mathbb{L} in which all Σ_2^1 sets are Lebesgue measurable and satisfy the Property of Baire.



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Corollary: the measurability (and PoB) of all Σ_2^1 sets is independent of ZFC.

Other results of Solovay

Theorem (Solovay, 1970)

*If M is a model of $ZFC +$ “there exists an inaccessible cardinal”, then there is a forcing extension $M[G]$ of M in which all **projective** sets are Lebesgue measurable, satisfy the Property of Baire and the Perfect Set Property.*

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Corollary: the measurability (and PoB and PSP) of all projective sets is independent of ZFC (plus inaccessible).

Even more results of Solovay

Theorem (Solovay, 1970)

*Let M and $M[G]$ be as before. In $M[G]$, there is an inner model which satisfies ZF but not AC, and in which **all** sets are measurable, satisfy the Property of Baire and the Perfect Set Property.*

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*Let M and $M[G]$ be as before. In $M[G]$, there is an inner model which satisfies ZF but not AC, and in which **all** sets are measurable, satisfy the Property of Baire and the Perfect Set Property.*

Corollary: the existence of non-measurable (non-PoB, non-PSP) sets cannot be proved without the Axiom of Choice!

Measurability and size of the universe

Recall:

- \mathbb{L} is the smallest inner model. $\mathbb{V} = \mathbb{L}$ is a statement about the **minimality** of the universe.
- Using forcing, we can add generic object G to \mathbb{L} , producing a larger universe $\mathbb{V} = \mathbb{L}[G]$.
- One particular forcing: *random forcing* (due to [Solovay, 1970]).

Measurability and size of the universe

Theorem (Judah-Shelah, 1989)

The following are equivalent:

- 1 all Δ_2^1 sets are Lebesgue-measurable,
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In both cases, point 2 asserts “transcendence over \mathbb{L} ” (i.e., in which way the actual universe is larger than the minimal one).

Other properties

- Given a regularity property, one hopes to find an equivalence theorem like the one above, but for different notions of “transcendence over \mathbb{L} ”.


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- Various results proved by Judah, Shelah, Brendle, Löwe, Halbeisen, Ikegami.
- Transcendence can have different “strength”, e.g.:
 - “all Σ_2^1 sets are Marczewski-measurable” is equivalent to “ $\forall r \in \mathbb{R} (\mathbb{R} \cap \mathbb{L}[r] \neq \mathbb{R})$ ”,
 - “all Π_1^1 sets satisfy the Perfect Set Property” is equivalent to “ $\forall r \in \mathbb{R} (|\mathbb{R} \cap \mathbb{L}[r]| = \aleph_0)$ ”.


Strongest statement



Weakest statement



Brendle & Löwe, *Eventually different functions and inaccessible cardinals*.



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Some results:
 - “there are no \aleph_1^1 Hausdorff gaps” is equivalent to “ $\forall r \in \mathbb{R} (|\mathbb{R} \cap \mathbb{L}[r]| = \aleph_0)$ ” (strongest possible transcendence statement).
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Some results:
 - “there are no Π_1^1 Hausdorff gaps” is equivalent to “ $\forall r \in \mathbb{R} (|\mathbb{R} \cap \mathbb{L}[r]| = \aleph_0)$ ” (strongest possible transcendence statement).
 - without assuming AC, one cannot construct Hausdorff gaps.
- ④ Maximal almost disjoint (m.a.d.) families.

Thank you!

yurii@deds.nl

INVITATION

You are cordially invited to the public defense of my PhD dissertation, entitled:

“Regularity Properties and Definability in the Real Number Continuum”

and the reception afterwards.

The ceremony will take place on Friday, 10 February 2012 at 11.00

in the Aula of the University of Amsterdam, Oude Lutherse kerk, Singel 411.

This means that

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